Torn between the two trade giants by Lee, Jaemin
Torn Between the Two Trade Giants: 
U.S.-China Trade Disputes and Korea
by Jaemin Lee
An old Korean proverb says that when two whales fight it 
is the shrimps whose backs are crushed. Maybe that prov-
erb best describes Korea’s situation on the trade front these 
days. The United States and China are engaged in trade 
disputes on many issues. All countries are holding their 
breath as they watch the surge of trade friction between 
the United States and China in various forums.1 Some of 
the disputes are pending at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) while others are addressed bilaterally through re-
spective domestic proceedings. Any challenge or measure 
by Washington against a Chinese product has been readily 
greeted by a comparable challenge or measure by Beijing 
against another U.S. product. Beijing’s confidence was 
further evidenced when it recently poked one of the sorest 
spots of the United States: it just initiated a countervailing 
duty (that is, an anti-subsidy) investigation against the U.S. 
bailout of the automobile industry, arguably thus far an 
almost taboo issue in the global trade community. In sum, 
the traditional scene of U.S. unilateral complaints against 
and bashing of China is now apparently changing.
Clearly there seems to be a sense of surprise on the part 
of the United States. It appears that the United States has 
been taken aback by China’s immediate and effective 
retaliatory measures against U.S. trade remedy measures 
directed toward China. The growing consensus among 
trade watchers seems to be that this is just the beginning, 
with a stronger dose of Sino-American tit for tat looming 
along the horizon of almost all trade fronts.2
Washington seems to be busy formulating a strategy to 
deal with the new China, as this is a patch of uncharted 
territory for the United States. Although the United States 
has experienced sporadic rivalries in the trade sector with 
other trade rivals such as the European Union and Japan, 
none has had the immediacy and the back-and-forth na-
ture of the relationship between the United States and China. 
The traditional trade tension across the Atlantic and the Pacific 
could be said to have been benign rather than malign, probably 
because both Brussels and Tokyo have maintained and tried to 
maintain stable alliances with the United States in diplomatic 
and military sectors and because the trade disputes have largely 
been part of the process of resolving bona fide differences among 
them. Recent disputes with China thus pose a different kind of 
challenge to the United States as a military and diplomatic alli-
ance does not exist between the two countries as exist between 
the United States and the EU and the United States and Japan. 
In fact, the U.S.-China rivalry is arguably more palpable in the 
military and diplomatic sectors.
All these disputes and the new environment in the global trade 
sector also pose difficult questions for Korea. As China is Ko-
rea’s largest trading partner and the United States the second, 
the trade friction and disputes between the two inevitably carry 
a significant impact on the overall trade interest of Korea. That 
is particularly the case as Korea is closely linked to the United 
States in all respects, and it is also becoming closer to China 
in terms of trade and economy. Thus, Korea’s position in these 
intense U.S.-China disputes is necessarily nuanced. As to some 
issues, Korea seems to share the U.S. position, most notably 
regarding China’s loose protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPR). As to other issues, Korea seems to share China’s position 
as an export-driven, government-coordinated country, most no-
tably regarding issues falling under the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty investigations sector. Korea’s concern becomes 
more acute because of the surge of Korean investment in China 
and in the United States. With increasing Korean investment in 
China and the United States, Chinese trade sanctions against 
the United States, or vice versa, thus may sometimes amount to 
indirect, though unintended, trade sanctions of Korea. Korea is 
therefore cautiously watching the current surge of trade friction 
between the two trade giants.
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This paper aims to discuss the implications for Korea of 
U.S.-China trade disputes and how Korea can ensure that 
these disputes do not unexpectedly disrupt Korea’s trade 
interests. Basically, for Korea there are both negative as-
pects and positive aspects flowing from the Sino-American 
trade disputes. The critical question is how Korea manages 
to ensure that it is not too exposed to negative aspects 
while it can build upon positive aspects.
Recent U.S.-China Bilateral Disputes
Recently, the United States and China have been quite busy 
at the WTO, suing each other and criticizing each other. 
During 2009–10, three main disputes have been decided 
by panels or the appellate body of the WTO. They are the 
IPR protection dispute,3 the trading rights and publication 
dispute,4 and the auto parts dispute.5 At the same time, four 
more disputes are currently pending at the WTO. They are 
the raw materials export restraint dispute,6 the AD/CVD 
simultaneous investigations dispute,7 the poultry import 
restriction dispute,8 and the tires safeguards dispute.9 In 
fact, among the six disputes resolved by the WTO in the 
2009–10 period, three were disputes between the United 
States and China.10 The remaining three disputes are those 
between Panama and Columbia, between Thailand and the 
United States, and between the EU and the United States.11 
Six out of 14 pending disputes at the WTO at the moment 
are disputes between the United States and China.12 All 
these resolved or pending U.S.-China disputes have oc-
curred since 2009.13 Between November 2001—the time 
that China joined the WTO—and 2009, no dispute-s 
between the two countries had been brought before the 
WTO. Not only the numbers but all U.S.-China disputes 
have been high-profile ones in which many countries have 
shown strong interest. Korea has also been watching and 
monitoring these disputes with great interest.
At the same time, the United States and China are also 
active on the bilateral front. China has been a perennial 
target of U.S. domestic trade remedy investigations, and 
the United States is becoming a new frequent target of 
Chinese investigations. Statistics show this trend: In terms 
of antidumping investigations by the United States, 14 out 
of 20 cases in the first half of 2009 were against China, 
making China the most frequent target of the United States 
during the period.14 In comparison, 6 out of 31 antidump-
ing investigations initiated by China in the second half of 
2009 were lodged against the United States, which also 
makes the United States the number one target of China 
in the same period.15 In terms of countervailing duty in-
vestigations, which aim at foreign governments’ illegal 
subsidization policies, 12 out of 17 U.S. investigations 
in the second half of 2009 were against China, making 
Beijing Washington’s most frequent target.16 During the 
same period, China initiated four countervailing duty 
investigations, and all of them were lodged against the 
United States.17 In short, on both the multilateral and the 
bilateral fronts, the two countries seem to be engaged in 
all-out trade battles.
In addition, there are other major U.S.-China disputes that 
take place outside the WTO proceedings or the domestic 
trade remedy investigation context. They include Google’s 
confrontation with the Chinese government regarding 
censorship of Internet materials18 and China’s alleged 
manipulation of the renminbi, its currency, to sustain its 
economy and exports.19
Same Rules, Different Thinking
One could argue that there is a unique aspect in U.S.-China 
trade disputes that differentiates them from other trade 
disputes. The uniqueness does not simply lie in the drastic 
surge of the number of disputes in recent days or in the fact 
that they are the two largest players in the global trading 
regime. A clash between these two trade giants does merit 
a different stature. But disputes between the United States 
and the European Union, another giant on the trade front, 
do not necessarily involve such a level of intensity and 
confrontation.20 Likewise, the uniqueness of U.S.-China 
disputes does not lie in the fact that one is developed 
and the other is developing. The United States has had 
high-profile trade disputes with other major developing 
countries such as Brazil and Mexico, but they have not 
registered this level of intensity and confrontation.21
Given the positions and arguments on both sides in some 
of recent disputes, it may be the case that sometimes the 
uniqueness of U.S.-China trade disputes arguably lies in 
the fundamental difference in perspectives between the 
two countries in terms of various trade-related economic 
policies. Of course, there are some easy disputes between 
the two where one could relatively easily determine which 
side is right or wrong, but increasingly some of the recent 
disputes between Washington and Beijing concern issues 
that possibly touch on the fundamental difference between 
the two in terms of formulating and implementing national 
economic policies. A proper role of a sovereign govern-
ment in times of economic crisis,22 a permissible policy 
boundary for a government to preserve key raw materials, 
legitimate administration of the criminal justice system of 
a government, and outer parameters of foreign exchange 
policies are some of the examples of issues raised in recent 
U.S.-China trade disputes. As one can imagine, disputes 
involving these issues defy a simple finding of violation 
by one country in a particular trade agreement.
Most of the time, the text of an agreement rarely provides 
sufficient norms on these rather philosophical issues, and 
the outcome pretty much depends on perspective, point of 
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view, context, or intention of the government concerned.23 
The problem is that, in the area of these perspective-
oriented issues, textual language sometimes fails to pro-
vide clear-cut guidance and leaves open the possibility of 
future constructive interpretation and application. In these 
circumstances, it is entirely possible that the disputing par-
ties may have different opinions, believing in good faith 
that their positions are vindicated according to the textual 
language: they may simply have different perspectives in 
doing business and carrying out obligations under a trade 
agreement. If trade agreements explicitly spelled out the 
norms, there would not be a problem. But sometimes in 
some areas trade agreements opt not to provide specific 
norms and guidelines. This is not the problem of sloppy 
work of treaty negotiators; instead, this is probably caused 
by the lack of sufficient time for negotiations, the neces-
sity for strategic ambiguity during the negotiations, and 
increasing interaction between trade norms and other 
international legal regimes.24
Specific Implications for Korea
Against this backdrop, this new trade environment of U.S.-
China trade conflict is currently causing specific implica-
tions for Korea. These implications include both negative 
and positive aspects, and they are discussed below.
Negative Implications
Negative implications for Korea arising from Sino-Amer-
ican trade disputes include the collateral damage effect, 
protectionism-stoking effect, trade politicization effect, 
perspective mismatch effect, and free trade agreement 
(FTA) complication effect. Of course, there may be other 
negative implications as well, but these examples at least 
offer a silhouette of such implications.
Collateral damage effect. Korean companies sometimes 
become victims of collateral damage from the U.S.-China 
trade disputes. As the Sino-American trade disputes con-
tinue to escalate in quantity and quality, both Washington 
and Beijing are quick and eager to initiate their respective 
trade remedy investigations against products from each 
other through their domestic proceedings. These domestic 
investigations are usually the easiest trade weapons at 
the fingertips of the two governments for addressing a 
particular problem posed. From time to time, however, 
Korean companies get snared in these investigations as 
they are unknowingly caught in the cross fire, as explained 
below. This could happen either when a Korean product is 
dragged into an investigation by Washington or Beijing or 
when U.S. or Chinese products produced from factories 
established by Korean investment become subject to an 
investigation by the other side. Then Korean companies 
producing these products or having made such investments 
are directly implicated.
Dragging Korean products into an investigation. An in-
creasing tendency in Washington seems to be that a peti-
tion filed by a U.S. domestic industry for a trade remedy 
investigation against China can easily include Korea as a 
companion target as well.25 In other words, the real moti-
vation and target of the petition is apparently China, but 
it nonetheless tends to include Korea or other countries 
to make the case easier to go forward because of some of 
the unique legal requirements applicable to such investi-
gations. The same situation is also observed in investiga-
tions initiated by Beijing against U.S. products. When an 
investigation is leveled at U.S. companies and products, it 
increasingly includes Korean counterparts as well.26
China’s fast change of status in this regard is indeed note-
worthy. For a long time, China has been by far the most 
frequent target of global antidumping investigations, but 
it has now become one of the most frequent users of such 
investigations. During the period 1995–2009, China had 
been a leading target of foreign antidumping investiga-
tions; its trading partners filed a total of 544 investigations 
against it. Korea follows China in second place, with 167 
investigations. The huge difference in number between 
China in the first place and Korea in second place indi-
cates the sheer intensity of global investigations against 
China.
During the same period, China registered itself as the sixth 
most frequent filer of antidumping investigations, by fil-
ing 130 investigations against foreign countries, while the 
United States is the second most frequent filer, with 333 
investigations in the same period.27 What is noteworthy 
here is that, while the number of investigations of the 
United States is evenly spread out during the period, in-
vestigations of China are back-loaded, indicating the surge 
of investigations of Chinese practices in recent years.28
Through its hard-earned experience, China has apparently 
understood the importance of initiating and utilizing trade 
remedy investigations in order to protect its domestic in-
terests.29 Unlike Korea, China has been able to turn itself 
into a major user of antidumping investigations as it has 
a sizable domestic market, which is one of the essentials 
for having an effective trade investigation mechanism in 
place. So, one could assume that both the United States and 
China are active users of trade remedy investigations at the 
moment and will remain so at least for the time being.
Domestic industries in the United States and China appar-
ently enjoy benefits from this multiple targeting strategy 
because in this way they can address multiple foreign 
competitors from different countries in single investiga-
tions. Legally speaking, it becomes much easier to satisfy 
the so-called material injury standard, which is one of the 
mandatory requirements for imposing most of the trade 
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remedy measures.30 In an effort to dilute the nature of 
U.S.-specific or China-specific trade remedy investiga-
tions, both countries seem to have an incentive to include 
Korean products and Korean exporters (and also products 
and exporters from other countries, for that matter) in the 
mix of targets, as Korea is a main exporter of almost all 
items destined for both countries and yet is not necessarily 
such a major power in the trade sector that the two coun-
tries would have to be cautious in dealing with it.
In fact, any U.S. trade measure against China and any 
Chinese measure against the United States could be 
equally applicable to Korea with some modifications and 
adjustments. For instance, considering the U.S. argument 
against China in the alleged renminbi manipulation dispute 
and its argument against Korea regarding Korea’s regula-
tion of the financial system, the United States seems to 
call on a similar logic, which is a government’s allegedly 
illegitimate intervention in the financial market to sustain 
overall export performance.31 Granted, there are stark 
differences in context between the two cases and gener-
ally between Korea and China, but one of the common 
underlying themes for both cases from the U.S. perspective 
seems to be that government-coordinated, export-driven, 
domestic company–supporting economic policies could 
be utilized as disguised trade measures and thus should 
not be permitted.
For its part, Korea has disagreed with such characteriza-
tions and perspectives by the United States and has argued 
that a foreign government’s general financial policy should 
not be amenable to trade disputes.32 This difference in 
perspective between Korea and the United States has led 
to WTO disputes and a domestic countervailing duty inves-
tigation by the United States against Korea, and the latter 
proceeding is now entering its ninth year.33 This indicates 
that any prospective action of the United States against 
China on these grounds might prompt U.S. domestic in-
dustries to revisit these old issues involving Korea.
Likewise, the logic behind China’s own antidumping 
and countervailing duty investigations against the United 
States could also be used against Korea with some modi-
fications. As such, Korean companies, which probably 
would not be selected for investigations on their own, 
are now being included as sidekicks in investigations 
aimed at Chinese or U.S. companies to facilitate these 
investigations. By no means is this a good sign for Korea. 
As bilateral trade disputes between the United States and 
China intensify and as more and more trade investigations 
ensue, this problem will further stand out.
Furthermore, the fact that the two countries are currently 
turning their focus from the traditional antidumping in-
vestigations to subsidy investigations is more alarming to 
Korea. The United States, after long domestic controver-
sies, has recently started to conduct subsidy investigations 
against China because apparently antidumping measures 
alone are not able to address the China problem;34 re-
markably, China is also responding in kind by initiating 
its own subsidy investigations against the United States 
regarding the automobile company bailout in the United 
States in 2008–09.35 Subsidy disputes involve domestic 
economic policies of the other country and thus carry much 
wider impact. Because of its government-coordinated and 
export-oriented economic structure and policies, Korea 
has been a perennial target of foreign subsidy investiga-
tions and has suffered a great deal of agony.36 The fact 
that both the United States and China are becoming more 
active in subsidy investigations is therefore ominous news 
for Korea.
U.S. and Chinese products with a Korean interest. Korean 
companies and products could also be implicated in the 
respective trade remedy investigations initiated by the 
United States and China when the products subject to 
investigations are produced by manufacturing facilities 
established by Korean investment. It is not uncommon 
that Korean companies relocate their manufacturing 
facilities to China or establish new investment in China. 
Products manufactured by these facilities are Chinese 
origin and can be captured by any U.S. investigation 
against the product.37 It is true that these products occupy 
only a fraction of Chinese products, but to the Korean 
companies implicated in the investigations, this would be 
of significant consequence.
It is also possible that U.S. products subject to Chinese 
investigations reflect the interest of Korean investors. 
China’s recent subsidy investigation against the automo-
bile industry of the United States shows this possibility. If 
China expands its investigation or initiates a new inves-
tigation against automobiles from the United States and 
if Korean automobile manufacturers in the United States 
start to export their products to China in the future, these 
U.S.-manufactured Korean automobiles will become the 
target of the Chinese investigations. As Korean investment 
in the United States is expected to grow, particularly if the 
Korea-U.S. FTA (KORUS FTA) goes into effect, Korea 
can expect to see more of this problem in the future.
Protectionism stoking effect. The surge of trade disputes 
between the United States and China may also help stoke 
the protectionist tendency in Korea. Viewing the surge 
of Sino-American bilateral trade disputes as evidence 
that these two countries also employ various measures 
to protect their domestic industries, Korean govern-
ment agencies have been tempted to consider adopting 
policies to protect and support domestic industries and 
companies.38 This has also prompted some of the Korean 
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companies to request that the Korean government adopt 
policies to support domestic industries. In other words, to 
the extent that U.S.-China trade disputes reveal the various 
protectionist measures of the two trade giants, the domestic 
pressure in Korea to introduce similar measures to help 
Korean companies maintain their competitiveness edge 
has mounted. This could easily develop into a situation 
where other trading partners claim that Korea introduces 
illegitimate protectionist measures, which may then lead 
to Korea’s own trade disputes with them. This will cause 
a long-term negative effect for Korea.
A recent example in Korea that attracted foreign investors’ 
attention is the discussion about introducing a measure 
to restrict foreign investment in areas involving national 
security and the ensuing legislative changes. The discus-
sions and changes were prompted by Korean companies 
that have seen and faced similar legislation in other trading 
partners, mainly the United States and China.39
Politicizing trade effect. At the same time, the surge of 
U.S.-China trade disputes could politicize Korea’s own 
bilateral trade issues with China. The acute sensitivity of 
the U.S.-China trade disputes has apparently made China 
more defensive to trade issues to be raised by other coun-
tries, including Korea. It is then feared that any bilateral 
trade conflict with Korea could elicit a harsher response 
from China than it otherwise would. These circumstances 
would make Korea more cautious in addressing trade 
issues with China and force Korea to increase its consid-
eration of political sensitivities when it approaches what 
are essentially trade issues.
Perception mismatch effect. Korea is torn between the 
two different perspectives held by the United States and 
China. On the one hand, Korea clearly espouses the per-
spective held by the United States, which supports fuller 
promotion of private activity, further protection of private 
property rights, and more liberalization and deregulation 
of the market. Over time, Korea has made significant ef-
forts to harmonize its perspectives and views with those 
of the United States in terms of economic regulation and 
policies. The effort originally started with the financial and 
regulatory reform following 1997 financial crisis, and it 
has been further expedited during the course of the FTA 
negotiations with the United States.
On the other hand, however, there are some economic or 
trade issues in the spectrum for which Korea’s perspectives 
are closer to those of China. These issues may include the 
role of the government in regulating private activity in 
the market and the appropriateness of the government’s 
intervention in the private sector.40 This does not mean that 
Korea supports China in specific disputes involving these 
issues; in fact, Korea may well have views different from 
China, and in specific disputes more often than not Korea 
has supported the U.S. position when it comes to a deter-
mination of a violation of trade agreements such as WTO 
agreements. Instead, it simply means that, irrespective of 
the possible violation of international trade agreements 
in technical terms, an argument can be made that Korea 
may at least understand the basic rationale of China in 
introducing certain economic or trade measures.
The clash between the United States and China regard-
ing alleged manipulation of the renminbi may provide 
an example. For a long time, foreign governments have 
claimed that the government of Korea is managing 
the Korean financial market for the benefit of Korean 
companies.41 This regulation of the financial market has 
caused constant concern on the part of foreign countries, 
particularly Western entities such as the United States and 
the European Union.42 They argue that when it comes to 
regulation of financial markets, the government of Korea 
has traditionally had a hands-on policy in order to achieve 
governmental goals. In their view, the government of Ko-
rea is orchestrating the financial market for the purpose of 
artificially inflating the competitiveness of Korean compa-
nies while putting foreign companies in a disadvantageous 
position or sometimes keeping them out of the Korean 
market. Korea has countered that it is simply adopting 
and implementing legitimate governmental policies, as 
does any other government. These interactions between 
Korea and other countries resemble those between China 
and the United States.
As such, U.S.-China disputes present instances in which 
Korea realizes the existence of a mismatch between the 
different perspectives looking at the same issue. After an 
official determination is rendered by authoritative forums 
such as the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, more 
guidance will be available for Korea. Because such an au-
thoritative answer takes a long time to come and because, 
even if it does, satisfactory clarity is usually missing, it 
is indeed difficult for Korea to adjust itself in the middle 
of conflicting perspectives. Sharp confrontation between 
the United States and China will continue to test these 
perspective-related trade issues over and over again. Each 
time, Korea will certainly monitor the disputes carefully, 
but Korea may face difficult moments in fine-tuning its 
perspective in between the two trade giants.
FTA complication effect. Another negative effect in this 
regard is the complication that Korea would feel as a result 
of the different approaches and models of the FTAs that 
the United States and China pursue. The KORUS FTA 
is waiting for congressional approval, and negotiations 
for the Korea-China FTA are now starting. The general 
speculation is that the China FTA will be among the top 
priorities for Korea in the near future. There are FTAs with 
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other countries, but FTAs with the United States and China 
stand ready to affect Korea’s economy and trade interests 
to a significant degree through economic integration.
Escalating trade disputes between the United States and 
China have prompted the two countries to solidify their 
respective FTA approaches and models to preserve their 
trade interests. As Korea currently pursues FTAs with 
the two countries, these discrepancies could complicate 
Korea’s coordination of domestic policies following the 
conclusion of these FTAs. For instance, China has a pro-
gram, called the Early Harvest Program (EHP), to provide 
preferential benefits even before an official FTA is signed, 
which is an integral part of China’s FTA strategy.43 This 
program, however, could be a violation of relevant WTO 
rules when viewed from the FTAs that the United States is 
concluding. Furthermore, the difference in approaches and 
models of the KORUS FTA and Korea-China FTA could 
complicate Korea’s implementation of these agreements 
when they go into effect.
Positive Implications
The bilateral trade disputes between the United States and 
China do not merely cause headaches for Korea. They 
also bring unexpected benefit as well. Korea can gather 
further factual information on the situation in China, and 
the positions and arguments of the United States and China 
regarding some key issues in which Korea has potentially 
strong interest are revealed in this process.
Clarification of facts and situations in China. One of 
the most important benefits that Korea has been enjoying 
from the surge of U.S.-China trade disputes is gaining 
knowledge of factual information and clarification from 
China. As recent disputes and cases demonstrate, any 
dispute against China is an introduction into a myriad of 
complex Chinese laws, regulations, and overlapping ju-
risdictions of governmental agencies.44 In many disputes, 
China has claimed that the United States mischaracterized 
the true meaning of the relevant Chinese laws and regula-
tions.45 Furthermore, China sometimes refers to legislative 
changes in relevant regulations46 and revocation of the 
existing measure.47
With respect to each claim, the respective explanations of 
both China and the United States of the operating mecha-
nisms of the measures and the alleged impact on the market 
show significant gaps and discrepancies. Thus, in any 
dispute involving China, clarification of key factual situ-
ations has become critical to the resolution of the dispute. 
Although official trade disputes between Korea and China 
are still quite rare because of the two countries’ cautious 
approaches and desire to avoid disputes, the Korean gov-
ernment and companies increasingly face a wide range of 
trade issues as the trade volume explodes. In addressing 
these trade issues in China, the most difficult task for the 
Korean government and companies seems to be to gather 
facts and confirm the true situation.
New information gathered by the United States or that 
otherwise turns up in the course of trade disputes between 
the United States and China helps Korea to have a better 
glimpse of the facts and situations in China. Korea would 
probably not be privy to this kind of information but for 
robust bilateral disputes between the United States and 
China.
U.S. claims reflect Korean concerns. Another benefit 
for Korea flowing from U.S.-China bilateral disputes is 
more substantive. The United States has raised issues 
that Korea could raise on its own but has not done so 
for various reasons. Ever since the garlic dispute back 
in 2000, when Korea and China imposed tit-for-tat trade 
sanctions,48 Korea has been careful not to repeat the same 
experience if at all possible, but the rapid growth of Korea-
China trade volume has constantly presented new issues 
and problems.
Under these circumstances, the U.S. effort to identify is-
sues and raise claims has addressed at least some of the 
concerns that Korea has had. The successful challenge by 
the United States of China’s loose IPR protections offers 
a good example.49 Legally speaking, China’s obligation 
from these disputes with the United States is directed only 
to the opposing party, the United States. But other coun-
tries, including Korea, can also benefit because China’s 
subsequent change of system or law also directly affects 
other countries as well. In other words, Korea stands ready 
to benefit from these changes as an unintended third-party 
beneficiary, so to speak.
Although Korea might gain from changes on the part of 
China, these gains alone will not allow Korea to deal suf-
ficiently with all its outstanding trade issues with China. 
Key issues and core concerns of Korea can be addressed 
only through Korea’s own initiation of discussions, nego-
tiations, and proceedings with China.
Learning by example and policy adjustment. From time 
to time, the rationale of the United States when it raises a 
particular trade issue against another country sometimes 
reflects Korea’s position on the same or a similar issue 
against that country. U.S.-China trade disputes sometimes 
create such a situation, and they can serve as a barometer 
for prospective Korea-China disputes.
China’s alleged failure to vigorously enforce IPR domesti-
cally could reflect the same concern on the part of Korea 
vis-à-vis China in the area of IPR. In these circumstances, 
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the U.S. pursuit of trade issues could offer Korea a glimpse 
of Beijing’s explanations and arguments regarding specific 
issues. If Korea ends up raising the issue in the future in 
prospective trade negotiations or disputes with China, 
chances are that China will resort to the same or similar 
explanations and arguments. Korea’s evaluation of China’s 
explanations and arguments through U.S.-China disputes 
will offer Korea a valuable guideline.
In fact, what particularly intrigues Korea at this juncture 
is seeing how China implements adverse rulings from the 
WTO or its other promises that it made when it joined the 
WTO in 2001. Successful U.S. challenges at the WTO 
against some of China’s measures have made China face 
this difficult task. Losing a dispute at the WTO is one thing, 
and implementing an adverse ruling (that is, changing 
domestic laws and regulations) is quite another. China’s 
ultimate implementation of adverse rulings may affect 
considerably Korea’s prospective decision to challenge 
Chinese trade measures against Korean companies and 
investors through formal proceedings.
Given that China has been critical of the WTO’s possible 
infringement on its sovereignty,50 it is difficult to predict 
how China will implement these adverse rulings.51 In 
“China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribu-
tion Services (DS363),” China referred to the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diver-
sity of Cultural Expressions, adopted in October 2005, to 
stress that cultural goods are different from other noncul-
tural goods and that the members preserve more leeway 
in regulating these goods.52 China’s point was that it could 
regulate foreign goods and services when it has legitimate 
concern about preserving its cultural identity; this argu-
ment was effectively rejected by the WTO’s panel.
Likewise, recent U.S.-China disputes have also made Ko-
rea realize a considerable gap exists between the United 
States and China in perceiving some of the fundamental 
issues in the trade sector. This realization could also help 
Korea prepare itself to respond to Korea-U.S. disputes. 
Although the context and backgrounds are quite different, 
some of the issues raised by the United States vis-à-vis 
China could apply to Korea with some modification. For 
example, the recent extensive U.S. search for China’s 
subsidy programs in both its central government and 
provincial governments could also function as an advance 
warning for Korea, which to some extent adopts similar 
programs in various sectors.
Exclusion of competitors in major markets. Another 
important benefit for Korea flowing from U.S.-China trade 
disputes is the possible exclusion of competitors from the 
respective markets. China’s exclusion of U.S. products or 
the U.S. exclusion of Chinese products from their home 
markets through various trade measures may create an 
environment in which Korean companies could capture 
the lost market share. As long as Korean companies are 
not included in the same trade remedy investigations, 
Korean companies could take advantage of a situation in 
which one of Korea’s major competitors is driven out of 
the market.
What Next for Korea?
Ever since the 1998 financial crisis and the 2008 financial 
crisis, Korea has been on a roller coaster in terms of its 
economy. Many times Korea’s robust trade performance 
led Korea out of the trenches. These events again etched 
in the minds of Koreans the importance of trade for main-
taining its economy and led Korea to continue to pursue 
its trade market expansion policy, most notably through 
FTAs. The intensifying U.S.-China disputes may turn out 
to be yet another important variable for Korea’s effort to 
navigate the uncharted territory.
For Korea, the implications of the Washington-Beijing 
trade battles are quite mixed. On the one hand, they tend to 
help Korea on its trade front, while on the other they further 
complicate Korea’s position in all these complex issues. 
It would be difficult to quantify these mixed implications, 
but the final score will depend on how Korea manages to 
maximize the positive side and minimize the negative side. 
The following issues will play a critical role for Korea’s 
successful management of the ultimate calculus.
Managing Korea-China Trade Disputes
For some time Korea and China have been cautious and 
have not created any major disputes on the trade front. At 
the same time, however, it is also true that the two countries 
have reached the point where trade disputes are increas-
ingly becoming an inevitable element of business, given 
the exploding volume of their bilateral trade.53 The pro-
spective Korea-China FTA will bring this situation to yet 
another level, and chances of disputes will proportionally 
increase. The problem is that any major dispute between 
Korea and China will not be simply resolved through a 
treaty interpretation or rules-based system.
As the recent Cheonan incident has shown, Northeast Asia 
is a volatile place, and the trade and economic environ-
ments cannot be fully separated from the political environ-
ment. One of Korea’s strategies in the future will be to 
continue to manage a relatively stable relationship with 
China. Vigorously pursuing a trade issue probably will 
not necessarily square with this strategy. Under these cir-
cumstances, Korea will most likely make efforts to avoid 
situations where Korea-China bilateral relationships go 
sour because of trade disputes. Trying as much as possible 
– 8 –
to avoid any major conflict, Korea will certainly endeavor 
to resolve a trade dispute through political settlement. It is 
likely, however, that Korea will be short-changed in this 
process on account of the imbalance of power between 
the two countries.
The surge of trade volume between Korea and China will 
foster more trade issues. Particularly when a core trade 
interest is on the line or the domestic situation requires 
it, Korea will be forced to pursue all avenues available 
as it does with any other trading partner.54 If Korea ends 
up going down this path, any dispute could become quite 
ugly, increasing the tension between the two countries. 
The fallout from this confrontation could also negatively 
affect Korea. Whether Korea makes an effort to avoid 
trade disputes or face them, chances are that Korea will 
end up having a shorter end of the deal unless Korea is de-
termined to pursue its trade agenda with China somewhat 
independent of various nontrade considerations, as it has 
done with the United States. Korea faces a dilemma. How 
Korea will fare in an era of U.S.-China disputes will be 
significantly affected by how Korea manages its current 
relative stability with China on the trade front. Korea will 
probably seek to enjoy an indirect benefit and free-riding 
from U.S. efforts in its disputes with China.
Managing the Role of a Trade Forward Base
After the KORUS FTA and Korea-China FTA go into 
effect, U.S. investment and Chinese investment in Korea 
will also increase. If U.S.-China trade disputes intensify, 
some U.S. and Chinese investment will be made for the 
purpose of establishing production platforms in Korea in 
order to avoid trade restriction measures against products 
manufactured in the United States and China. Products 
manufactured in Korea with U.S. investment or Chinese 
investment would be treated as Korean products in these 
markets; thus, they could be subject to trade remedy mea-
sures against Korea but not against the United States or 
China.55 Korea would operate as a forward base for U.S. 
and Chinese companies.
If Korea manages this new environment effectively, it 
might attract foreign investment, which is one of Korea’s 
national objectives.56 But this could also bring another risk 
to Korea: Korea might be more directly involved in Sino-
American trade disputes. In other words, if in the future 
major Chinese manufacturers establish a manufacturing 
facility in Korea to use as their platform for export to the 
United States, then the aim of U.S. trade remedy measures 
would settle on Korea, the country of manufacture, and 
the situation would then become a trade dispute between 
Korea and the United States. How Korea manages this new 
role under the new environment would affect significantly 
how Korea will fare in the U.S.-China trade dispute era.
Adjusting Differences in Perspectives
At least for the time being it seems unlikely that the United 
States and China will be able to find common ground in the 
trade sector and avoid disputes. These disputes seem to be 
deeply rooted in the difference in perspectives, and these 
perspectives are hard to change. Maybe merely counting 
the number of antidumping measures, countervailing duty 
measures, or safeguards measures shows only the tip of the 
iceberg. A legalistic approach based on WTO agreements 
and, if necessary, following WTO litigation, which the 
two countries seem to be pursuing these days, is always 
important, but it should not be the central pillar of dealing 
with the current problem of the increasing number of trade 
disputes between the two countries. WTO norms are not 
sufficient and detailed enough, so disputes between major 
trading partners (such as China, the United States, and the 
EU) addressing WTO norms regarding new issues (such 
as trade and environment, trade and security, trade and 
financial sovereignty, and trade and culture) are bound to 
intensify, and the losing party will do whatever it takes to 
reject a ruling or to find an excuse to delay implementa-
tion of the ruling.
These disputes cannot be effectively resolved by simply 
relying on WTO agreements or through a conventional 
procedure such as the WTO dispute settlement procedure. 
Generally speaking, these new disputes will be controlled 
only when major trading partners will be able to assure 
each other that various domestic measures are bona fide 
public policy measures and not disguised trade measures. 
This is to build a consensus that, by refraining from in-
troducing disguised measures, all of them will benefit in 
the long run. It may take a considerable amount of time 
for this consensus to build between the United States and 
China.
If it takes time to build such consensus between the two 
trade giants, Korea’s positioning in the interim will con-
tinue to be precarious. How Korea manages this precarious 
situation will be an important determinant for how Korea 
will fare in the era of U.S.-China trade disputes.
Conclusion
The United States and China are engaged in a range of 
high-profile trade disputes. As it currently stands, the 
bilateral trade disputes between the two countries seem 
likely to continue to intensify in the future. For instance, 
if the Trans-Pacific Partnership—apparently one of the 
policy priorities of the United States in the trade sector—
emerges in the Pacific basin region, the level of intensity 
of the disputes will increase as China might as well feel 
contained by this U.S.-led trade bloc in the region. China 
might try to form a similar bloc of its own.
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The disputes between China and the United States, Korea’s 
number one and number two trading partners, present a 
new trade environment for Korea. On the one hand this 
new environment brings incidental benefits to Korea, but 
on the other this poses new challenges for Korea. Although 
it is difficult to quantify which aspect outweighs which, 
what is clear is that Korea cannot simply remain insulated 
from this new environment, and it is exposed to various in-
direct effects. Furthermore, what makes the situation more 
complicated is that Korea is currently pursuing further 
economic integration with the United States and China, 
though with varying degrees, through its respective FTAs 
with the two countries. Under these circumstances, any 
effect for Korea from this environment has the potential 
to become more direct than before. Unless Korea man-
ages this new challenge successfully, its position in the 
global community in terms of trade and its performance 
in the trade sector will become more precarious. If Korea 
cannot get itself out of the collision entirely, we had better 
buckle up tight.
Dr. Jaemin Lee is an associate professor of law at the 
College of Law at Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea. A for-
mer KEI fellow, Dr. Lee has published previously in Volume 
2 of On Korea. 
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